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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OFTHESTATEOFUTAH 
C.R. OWENS TRUCKING 
CORPORATION 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
HAROLD STEWART 
Defendant and Respondent, 
Case No. 
12988 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action brought by the plaintiff for damages 
sustained to its truck which resulted when the truck hit 
a cow owned by the defendant on Highway 91 in Millard 
County, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff moved for a change of venue (R. 17), which 
motion was denied. A jury trial was then held wherein 
the jury found for the defendant and against the 
plaintiff, no cause of action. Plaintiff then moved for 
judgment not withstanding verdict or for a new trial (R. 
75 ), which motion was also denied. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks to have the verdict of the jury set aside 
based upon the prejudicial statement of defendant's 
counsel regarding the non-existence of insurance, and 
that seven of the eight jurors were personally 
acquainted with the defendant and were engaged in the 
same vocational endeavors as the defendant. The 
plaintiff would further ask that a change of venue be 
granted to a district court where impartial jurors could 
be obtained. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case arose as a result of an accident which oc· 
curred at approximately 10 p.m. on the 22 day of July, 
1971, on U.S. Highway 91 approximately four tenths of a 
mile south of Meadow, Utah. A cow owned by the 
defendant darted in front of a semi truck owned by the 
plaintiff and driven by its agent. As a result of the 
collison the wheels of the truck locked and the truck 
went into a concrete ditch resulting in the damage 
which plaintiff alleges was as follows: $8, 421. 76 for 
repairing the truck, $1,423.67 for repairing the flat bed, 
$377.00 for towing expense, and $5,000 for loss of use 
while the turck was being repaired. 
Plaintiff alleged that defendant was negligent in the 
maintenance of his fence thus allowing the cow on the 
highway which resulted in the accident. 
At the time of the trial, of the selected jurors, seven 
of the eight were personally acquainted with the 
defendant and seven of the eight were engaged , either 
directly or through their husbands, in raising livestock. 
(Tr. 2 thru 29) A challenge for cause was made against 
each ofthe jurors who fit into both of the categories, but 
such challenge was overruled by the court. (Tr. 29 and 
30). 
During the course of the trial, defendant's attorney 
made the statement which was recalled by plaintiff's 
at_torney as being "I want the jury to know that my 
chent does not have insurance, he is on his own," (R. 
75), but which the transcript indicates was "There is no 
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insurance involved in this case, your Honor, may we 
make that clear" (Tr. 31). However, the defendant had 
in force an insurance policy providing liability coverage 
e in an amount in excess of the prayer of plaintiff's 
s complaint and any taxable costs (R. 82). 
d 
y ARGUMENT 
POI NT I e 
e THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT A 
j MISTRIAL OR A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON THE 
PREJUDICIAL STATEMENT OF DEFENDANTS 
COUNSEL REGARDING INSURANCE 
A. ADMISSABILITY OF EVIDENCE REGARDING 
DEFENDANT'S INSURANCE. 
The general rule, everywhere adherred to, is that in a 
personal injury action, evidence that the defendant 
carries insurance protecting him from liability to third 
persons on account of his negligence is inadmissable 
Balle vs. Smith 81 U 179 17 P2d 224 (1932). The 
Rationale for this position is stated by Justice Polland in 
his opinion in Balle (cited supra) at page 229. 
"It <the fact of insurance) is irrelevant to the issue of 
negligence ... <and) is wholly inadmissable ... 
The Justice goes on to state that courts jealousy gained 
against the (interjection) of insurance issues not only 
because of irrelevance but also because of the highly 
prejudicial nature of that evidence. He states that it is 
widely believed that once jurors know a defendant is 
insured, they will be less likely to decide the case on the 
merits and will return larger verdicts than they 
otherwise might have done. Reason follows that if 
knowledge of insurance would have this result, a 
knowledge of the absence of insurance which resulted 
in this case would prejudice a jury against the plaintiff 
and in favor of the defendant. 
Utah cases on the question of insurance admissability 
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have usually arisen from the factual circumstances 
wherein the defendant objected to the entry into the 
case of fact of his liability coverage. There has been no 
case presenting the exact factual question herein 
presented, which is: 
Can the defendant through evidence or argument by 
counsel bring before the jury the fact that he is not in-
sured. The answer here must also be no. The Rational 
behind the non-admittance of insurance remains un-
changed. If it's existence is deemed prejudicial to one 
side, then, its nonexistence would be equally prejudicial 
to the other. In the Utah case of Hill vs. Cloward, 14 
U2d55, 377 P2d 186 (1962), Chief Justice Crockett in 
addressing himself to the plaintiff's right to have the 
insurance issue excluded from the jury stated, 
" .. .inasmuch as the defendant is entitled to have this 
extra4eous matter excluded from the case, the plaintiff is 
entitled to the same protection if he so desires." 
Other jurisdictions in which this question has arisen 
have uniformly held that the defendant cannot interject 
into the trial the fact that he is not, or is only partially, 
insured. See Anno 4ALR2d 761 Sec. 4 at 773. And this is 
true even when plaintiff has raised the question of in-
surance through voir dire examination of the jury. (See 
Anno 4ALR2d, cited supra) Utah policy, as stated in 
Balle and Hill, wherein the insurance issue should not 
be brought by either party before the trier of fact is in 
accord with the view of these jurisdictions. Thus, in 
Utah, it is unquestionably settled law that any fact 
tending to show that defendant either does or does not 
carry liability insurance is inadmissable as evidence. 
The issue of insurance can be brought up before the 
trial of fact without constituting prejudicial error and 
thus grounds for reversal. The voir dire examination of 
the jury is one such permissible time. The Utah rule. 
would be that at least the inference of insurance could 
be raised during the voir dire while empaneling a jury if 
counsel is acting in good faith and for the purpose of 
ascertaining the qualifications of jurors, and not merely 
for the purpose of informing them that defendant is 
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insured. See Balle at 229. But, this right to question 
jurors as to any pecunlary interest they might have in 
an insurance company is strictly limited. Defendants 
right to have fact of insurance suppressed is directly in 
balance. Counsel who treads beyond the thin line 
allowable runs the risk of having a mistrial declared 
due to his raising of the insurance issue. See Morrison 
v. Perry 104 U151140P2d 772 (1943) at 778, wherein the 
court held that conduct of plaintiff's counsel in 
questioning prospective jurors so as to indicate that the 
insurance company was the real party in interest 
constituted misconduct and was reversible error. Here, 
the court stated that the permissible method for voir 
dire of prospective jurors was set forth in Balle v. 
Smith.That by questioning jurors as to their financial 
interests in specifically named insurance institutions 
went too far, towards suggesting the presence of in-
surance, and thus constituted reversible error, not-
withstanding the lack of any showing of specific 
prejudice created by the question. 
Another Utah case permitting the fact of defendants 
insurance to be brought before the jury is Reid v. 
Owens 98 P50, 93 P2d 680 0939). This, however, involves 
a narrowly limited exception to the general rule 
where the defendants statement that he is insured is so 
connected with his admission on the question of 
liability, that the entire admission is allowed into 
evidence. This exception is not presented by our facts. 
We would submit that it is the rule in Utah that except 
for the narrowly drawn exceptions above mentioned, 
<interjection) of the insurance issue within hearing of 
the trier of fact constitutes misconduct of counsel and 
reversible error. · 
B. REVERSIBLE ERROR CREATED BY 
MISCONDUCT OF COUNSEL WHO BRINGS THE 
ISSUE OF INSURANCE BEFORE THE TRIER OF 
FACT. 
In Balle where the issue of insurance had arisen on 
Plaintiff's counsels voir dire examination of the jury 
and through a later statement by counsel, the court set 
6 
forth guidelines as to whether the statements con-
stituted reversible error. Whether counsel abused his 
privilege by forcing the fact of insura nee to the at-
tention of the jury is a test (Balle at 229). Where the 
remark by counsel concerning insurance was improper, 
grounds exist for reversible error due to the misconduct 
of counsel. Balle cites 56 ALR 1486 as authority for the 
proposition that such a remark is misconduct and would 
be grounds for reversible error if the jury was in-
fluenced by the statement. 4 ALR2 761 cites cases which 
demand an automatic reversal in such instances due to 
the extremely prejudicial nature of the insurance 
question. 
Other factors in Balle which could be used by a court 
in determining the prejudicial nature of counsel's 
misconduct are: 
1. Whether the remark was made in good faith, or was 
made wilfully and calculated to prejudice the jury. 
2. Whether the verdict or the amount of the judgment 
were altered greatly by the prejudicial statement. 
Plainly, it is no better for the defendant whether the 
jury learns he is insured by accident or wilfully. The 
rule is obviously designed to deter counsel's willful 
statements. 
No more willful statement could be presented than by 
our facts. Clearly the statement was intended to be 
heard by the jury and it was calculated to influence 
them. It would be difficult to determine the effect of a 
prejudicial statement concerning insurance on any 
given jury. Courts which employ the change of out-
come criteria do so by comparing the outcome of the 
case with the insurance issue to a similar case where 
the insurance issue was properly suppressed. If the 
verdict is substantially different than the normal result, 
this would be one factor in determining whether the 
remark prejudicially influenced the jury. However, this 
test has only been employed in those cases that 
defendant has lost and appealed assigning as error the 
~act that plaintiff had brought in the question of his 
msurance. See Balle at 231 where the court held the 
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remark was not reversible error citing for one reason 
the verdict not being overly excessive. 
We submit that when the jury is directly informed 
that defendant is not insured that the only cause for the 
prejudice created other than a new trial, would be to 
allow plaintiff to prove that defendant was indeed in-
sured. In our case, the fact that plaintiff recovered 
nothing is one cirteria which the court should look to in 
assessing prejudice created by the remark. 
In Mornson vs. Perry supra, the court reversed and 
remanded the case to the district court for a new trialln 
reversing, the court held that it was misconduct and 
reversible error for plaintiff's counsel to attempt to 
interject the fact of insurance at the trial by asking 
jurors on voir dire whether they were stockholders in or 
knew the agents of a particular insurance company. In 
ruling, the court cited Justice McDonough in Reid vs. 
Olson (supra). 
"If questions are propounded ... for the obvious purpose of 
revealing such irrelevant fact <insurance) a mistrial may be 
properly declared or a new trial granted". 
In our case, this court should not let counsel ac-
complish by direct statement what it has not let others 
accomplish by guise and subterfuge. 
In Hill vs. Cloward (supra) the court in holding that 
plaintiff had the right to keep the insurance (or lack of 
it) issue from the jury, refused to grant a new trial 
because plaintiff had waived his right thereto by 
failure to enter a timely objection to the admission of 
the insurance statement. However, Hill is in accord 
with the other Utah cases in applying the rational found 
in Balk excluding insurance issues. Hill states only that 
one must properly preserve his right by objection if it is 
to be raised on appeal. 
Robinson vs. H Reinson 17U 2d 261, 409 P2d 121 (1965) 
is in accord with the earlier Balle case in that both agree 
that any mention whatsoever of insurance will not 
compel a mistrial or a new trial. Instances where this 
has occurred have been discussed above. But, Robinson 
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does place much responsibility with the trial court for 
determining whether the insurance issue has so 
prejudiced a party that he cannot obtain a fair trial and 
for making whatever corrective measures he deems 
suitable. In effect, Robinson is against the proposition 
that any mention of insurance constitutes reversible 
error and leaves room for restoration of damage 
through curative instructions and admonitions by the 
trial judge. However, the rationale of Robinson is not 
applicable wholly to our case. Robinson is based on the 
promise that the mention of insurance is less prejudicial 
to today's defendant because insurance is now so 
common that today's juror assumes defendant carries 
it. (Robinson at 123). The court goes on to state that the 
question of insurance should still be left out of the trial, 
and that it is the duty of court and counsel to keep it out, 
but, presumbably, if the issue does get in, its not as 
prejudicial as before. But, since today's juror assumes 
defendant is insured, it is now even more prejudicial to 
plaintiff to allow defendant to claim that he is not. 
Robinson mentions other factors in consideration of 
the prejudicial nature of the remark. These are es-
sentially those discussed in Balle. 
1. Whether the mention of insurance was intentional or 
inadvertantly discussed and the court rightly decides that the 
harm is substantially the same either way? 
2. The test which is determinative is whether the " ut-
terence was so harmful" so as to deprive a party of a fair 
trial. This depends on whether a "Reasonable likelihood" 
exists that in the "absence of the incident there would have 
been a substantially different result." 
We would respectfully submit to the court that in view 
of plaintiff's substantial actual damages coupled with a 
substantial issue of liability,that defendant's counsel's 
utterance was so harmful that there is a reasonable 
liklihood a substantially different result would have 
been reached had that incident not occured. And, 
practically, the only way to keep the insurance issue out 
of these cases to deter those who would interject it. 
The policy of the state of Utah is to exclude these issues 
<All cases cited concur).Robinson inposes it as a duty of 
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counsel to keep these elements from the trier. In our 
case we have a deliberate statement by counsel 
focusing attention squarely upon the prohibited in-
surance issue. We submit that the only way to cure a 
naked statement by counsel as was made here, was to 
allow proof of the existence of insurance, or to grant a 
new trial. It has been to the present the law in Utah to 
award a new trial to the party the victim of such a 
statement as was herein made. In Young vs. Barney, 20 
u 2dl08 433 P2d 846 (1967) Chief Justice Crockett 
speaking for the court on the issue of keeping insurance 
issues from the trier of fact stated: 
"The safeguarding against disclosure to a jury of in-
surance coverage in personal injury trials is a very touchy 
subject which lawyers and judges have always been obliged 
to handle with such caution as to justify use of the metaphor 
•walking on eggs. ' The understanding has always been that 
it was prejudicial error to deliberately inject insurance into 
such a trial" 
For this proposition, Chief Justice Crockett cites 
Balle as well as other cases discussed above including 
Robinson. In view of the deliberate injection of the in-
surance issue through defendant's counsels statement, 
we submit that prejudicial error occurred and a new 
trial should be granted. 
POINT II 
BASED UPON THE NATURE OF THE CASE, THE 
DEFENDANT INVOLVED, AND THE AVAILABLE 
JURORS, THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
GRANT PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR A CHANGE OF 
VENUE. 
Of further prejudice to plaintiff's rights was the trial 
courts failure to grant plaintiff's m<_>tl()!lf()r a change of 
venue. UCA 78-13-9 provides for a [c!iscretionary change 
?f venue from a county having proper venue where there 
is reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot be had 
due to local prejudice, bias, or the inability to locate 
among the local populace a fair and impartial jury. 
The -obvious purpose behind the Utah Statute and 
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similar statutes in other jurisdictions is to promote the 
ends of justice by getting rid of local prejudices which 
may operate detrimentally to the rights of a party 
(Litigant). Trial judges should in these questions follow 
the admonition of Justice Larson in Anderson vs. 
Johnson 1U2d400, 268 P2d 427 (1954), and give a liberal 
construction to this statute so as to render possible the 
attainment of its object. VCA 78-13-9 (2) is written 
broadly enough so as to provide the trial court with a 
vehicle to order a change of venue for any reason if it 
appears a party might have problems obtaining a fair 
trial by an impartial jury. Cases from other jurisdic-
tions cited in the collateral references to this statute 
have provided for a change of venue where a large 
number of the inhabitants of a county have an interest 
adverse to one of the parties Litigant(see 103 ALR 1025) 
or when local prejudice directed towards an officer or 
stockholder of a corporation may prevent the cor-
poration from obtaining its right to a fair trial. See 63 
ALR 1015. Trial courts should grant changes of venue 
and thereby guarantee a party's right to a fair trial in 
all cases where from the facts of the case it reasonably 
appears local prejudice will prevent a party from 
rightfully obtaining a fair and impartial adjudication of 
case on its merits. 
In this case, it appears on its face that a truck owner 
from the northern part of the state attempting to 
recover damages incurred in Millard County, would not 
be able to receive a fair trial from an impartial jury in 
that county, especially where that jury is largely 
composed of fellow cattlemen and their wives. 
Page 1-31 of the transcript of proceedings at the trial 
contains the examination of prospective jurors both by 
the trial judge and by plaintiff's attorney. Pursuant to 
this examination, the record reveals that seventeen 
prospective jurors were questioned. Of this number, 
only three did not know the defendant. The other 
fourteen knew defendant in various degrees, some 
having known him since childhood, others being 
relatives and others knowing him from business 
associations including membership in the same cattle 
grazing association. Three jurors were excused for 
.he 
ch 
·ty 
>w 
)8, 
·aJ 
~e 
~n 
a 
it 
If 
e 
e 
;t 
i) 
r 
11 
cause including one relative, one fellow member of the 
grazing association and one cattleman who had earlier 
been involved in a similar suit and claimed that that 
fact might influence his judgement in the present case 
of the remaining fourteen jurors. All but two were 
closely connected with the cattle business. Ap-
proximately one third raised cattle as their main 
business. The others maintained various numbers of 
livestock ranging from one hundred twenty five to ten. 
Of the two people who ran no cattle, one raised quar-
terhorses for sale. 
The prospective members of the jury were well aware 
that this type of suit occurs in their area. Three of the 
seventeen stated that they had themselves been in-
volved in similar types of suits, though one only as a 
juror. Another stated that although he ran a good 
number of cattle, that he always maintained his fences 
well and thus, had had no trouble with any law suits. 
The courts have recognized that it is not the nature of 
man to make a decision which might run contrary to his 
own interests, be they pecuniary or otherwise. Case law 
exists in matters where jurors are disqualified from 
hearing a particular case or a particular type of case. 
As in the change of venue situation, the fundamental 
rule is that jurors must be thoroughly impartial as 
between the parties. Any bias or prejudice with respect 
to a case disqualifies one as a juror. Logan vs. U.S. 144 
U.S. 263. 
Speaking to the issue of Juror Bias, such bias can be 
actually proven to exist, or implied, which is to say 
presumed by law to exist. A large body of case law has 
developed which states that if a certain relationship or 
mutuality of interest is found to exist between a juror 
and a party, the juror is presumed to be biased either 
for or against the party and should be disqualified. 
Bias of a juror, either express or implied, is grounds 
in this state for a challenge for cause. UCA 47 F (6). In 
Utah, bias has been defined to be a state of mind in 
which a person will not act with total impartiality. Hopt 
vs. Utah 120 U.S. 430. 
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Courts also recognize bias growing out of social, 
business or professional relationships. Persons who 
through their affiliations or friendships, prejudices or 
habits come to look more favorably upon one party in a 
case or more favorably upon one side in a particular 
class of cases are subject to disqualification. Further, it 
is reported to be the growing trend to disqualify from 
service the juror who has one of the above described 
interests, even when such interest would not itself be 
sufficient to challenge that juror for cause. 79 ALR 278. 
Courts have recognized impliedly that bias may exist 
when a stockholder sits on a jury in a suit wherein his 
corporation is a party litigant. And this is true even 
when his only interest is to hold stock in a corporation 
which holds stock in the corporation which is a party to 
the suit. 31 AM. Jur Juries 171. 
One who has any interest in an insurance corr.pany 
will be barred from serving as a juror in a case in which 
the insurance company has an interest in the outcome . 
Any interest has been held to mean an agent of the 
company, a stockholder thereof, or a relative of a 
stockholder. 31 AM. Jur. Juries 1972. 
Although a split of authority exists as to whether this 
relationship bars one from serving on the jury, the 
courts do recognize that as a practical matter, bias may 
exist where members of a jury are also members of a 
municipality or other government body which is a party 
to the suit. And this is true even when the only interest 
would be the presumable loss to the taxpayer should the 
suit end adversely to the government body. 31 AM. Jur. 
Juries 176. 
Social or economic adherences are also recognized as 
a cause implying bias in an interested juror. Metallic 
Gold Mineral Co. vs. Watson 117 P609 held that one 
having a strong sympathy for laboring men was 
disqualified from serving on a jury in a case where one 
of the parties was a laborer. 
In Utah, both parties have the right to have their case 
decided by an impartial jury, free from bias and 
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prejudice. Although specific examples of pecuniary 
interest or other sufficient relationships between jurors 
and parties are not spelled out by the code, it is 
automatic that in Utah as in other jurisdictions, the 
courts well recognize implied bias arising from an in-
terest in the outcome of a case beyond that of a normal 
juror. We submit that in this case a prospective juror 
who is a personal friend and fell ow cattleman of the 
defendant's and who well realizes that he may himself 
soon be the defendant in a similar action, has such an 
interest in the case, pecuniary and otherwise, that he 
cannot meet this states definition of an impartial juror. 
Indeed, one prospective juror stated that such fact 
would tend to influence him to favor the cattleman. 
However, he later retreated somewhat from this 
position and plaintiff's counsel's motion to a challenge 
for cause was denied. (tr. 19,28) 
This is the type of case contemplated by UCA 78-13-9 
with its provisions for granting a change of venue in the 
interests of justice when local prejudice or feeling may 
prevent a fair trial. 
The trial judge asked each prospective juror who 
owned cattle whether or not he also drove a car, ap-
parently in the belief that the interests would balance 
each other. We believe that it is a mistake to think that 
the jurors interests do balance. When one drives as an 
incidental, but maintains cattle as a livelihood, we 
submit that the interest in the preservation of the 
livelihood would be far greater. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that there are various factors which 
should be considered accumulatively, such factors being 
natural sympathy of the community for a local in-
dustry, the personal interest that nearly all members of 
the jury had in the cattle business, the fact that this type 
of litigation appeared to be fairly prevalent and known 
well among members of the jury, the fact ·that the 
defendant was generally well known in the community 
and was numbered among the friends of various 
14 
members of the jury, and the fact that defendants 
counsel's statement of the non-existence of insurance 
was particularly prejudicial in light of the above factors 
causing jurors to believe that their friend and fellow 
cattleman would be bearing payment of the suit himseH. 
In view of all the circumstances, plaintiff submits that 
prejudicial error has been committed, that a fair im-
partial trial was not obtained and the case should be 
remanded to a different district court for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Carl T. Smith 
Stephen W. Farr 
Smith and Farr 
520 26th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
